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A R T I C L E S

A Response to
the IPCC Fifth
Assessment
by Sarah J. Adams-Schoen,
Deepa Badrinarayana, Cinnamon
Carlarne, Robin Kundis Craig,
John C. Dernbach, Keith H. Hirokawa,
Alexandra B. Klass, Katrina Fischer
Kuh, Stephen R. Miller,
Jessica Owley, Shannon Roesler,
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Inara Scott,
and David Takacs

Summary
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report presented significant data and findings about climate change. But the
IPCC’s working groups’ summaries for policymakers
avoid making normative statements about the IPCC’s
findings. The authors, members of the Environmental
Law Collaborative, bridge this gap by identifying the
normative claims that stem from the working groups’
summaries to spark deeper discussion and help shape
the IPCC’s sixth assessment.

I.

On September 27, 2013, Working Group I released its
report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis,
which concluded, with 95% confidence, that climate
change is occurring and humans are causing it.1 Working
Groups II and III followed with their reports in 2014—
respectively, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability and Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of
Climate Change. Collectively, these three reports constitute
the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). This Article’s
authors used the AR5 as the text through which to examine how issues of climate change are presented and, moreover, what is missing from that presentation. The authors
found that not everything was fully accounted for, even in
the three massive Working Group reports. With particular concentration on the three Working Group Summaries
for Policymakers, the authors decided to use the AR5 as a
springboard for discussing the relationship between environmental science, environmental and natural resources
law and policy, and the social issues that arise where those
two meet.
The Summaries for Policymakers primarily focused on
empirical claims. Each Working Group assembled facts
about climate change and presented a compendium of the
information gathered. To have any meaning for law and
policy, however, the facts of the Summaries for Policymakers must be refracted through a series of value claims (for
example, “biodiversity is good” or “considering the needs
of future generations is more important than over-consuming Earth’s resources today”) to generate normative claims.
The Summaries for Policymakers shied away from such
normative claims.
Authors’ Note: The authors collectively engaged in this project as the
Environmental Law Collaborative. We would like to thank several
institutions for the support needed to make this project possible,
including the University of Idaho College of Law and the Teton
Science School in Jackson, Wyoming. While they were unable to
join us for the writing of essays, the Collaborative was also enriched
by David M. Driesen and Sarah Krakoff, both of whom attended
and contributed to the Collaborative’s second meeting. We would
also like to thank ELI for their continual support of our efforts. The
Environmental Law Collaborative’s first collection of essays appeared
in ELR two years ago. [See Michael Burger et al., Rethinking
Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge, 43 ELR
10342 (Apr. 2013)]. The group expanded these essays into a booklength project. [Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the
Climate Change Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith Hirokawa
eds., forthcoming 2015)].
1.	
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Introduction

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 4, 15 (2013), available at
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter WGI Summary for Policymakers].
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Normative claims, however, are the provenance of lawyers and law professors. How should we live our lives? How
should laws (in general, or in a specific area) be rewritten to reflect the realities of climate change? What new
laws should be written? How should laws be enforced or
interpreted, given changing ecological circumstances?
How should a changing climate prompt changes in existing systems of environmental resource governance? Who
should have a say in implementing the law that governs
your resource of interest?
This Article explores how the empirical claims generated
by the IPCC should be translated into normative claims.
The methodology used was to choose an excerpt from one
of the Summaries for Policymakers (each excerpt is an
empirical claim) and then write a normative response to
that claim. The responses may serve as jumping-off points
for deeper discussions and action by the environmental law
community and, potentially, even as a way to conceptualize the framework for the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment.

II.

Finding the Energy to Mitigate

This section was authored by Cinnamon Carlarne, Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio
State University.
Climate change is a massive environmental problem, but
it is much more than that. It is also a security problem,
a human rights problem, a trade problem, an economic
development problem, a public health problem, and, at
its very roots, an energy problem. We delay mitigation
efforts in significant part because mitigating climate
change requires making fundamental changes to our
energy system, and our energy system rests at the center of the dominant economic model. Change is hard.
Yet, change is necessary. The necessity of change is highlighted by AR5, which states, in key part: Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today through 2030
is estimated to substantially increase the difficulty of the
transition to low longer-term emissions levels and narrow
the range of options consistent with maintaining temperature change below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels
(high confidence).2
2.	

IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change:
Summary for Policymakers 13-14 (2014), available at http://report.
mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_
approved.pdf [hereinafter WGIII Summary for Policymakers]. The
section continues:
Cost-effective mitigation scenarios that make it at least as likely
as not that temperature change will remain below 2°C relative to
pre-industrial levels (2100 concentrations between about 450 and
500 ppm [parts per million] CO2eq [carbon dioxide equivalent])
are typically characterized by annual GHG emissions in 2030 of
roughly between 30 GtCO2eq and 50 GtCO2eq. Scenarios with
annual GHG emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 are characterized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030
to 2050; much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this
period; a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long-term;
and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts. Due to
these increased mitigation challenges, many models with annual
2030 GHG emissions higher than 55 GtCO2eq could not produce
scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels that make it as
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Yet, the only way to avoid delaying mitigation indefinitely is to be as frank as possible in identifying climate
change as sitting at the nexus between energy and environmental law. Mitigating climate change means making changes in the energy sector. In the United States,
for example, in 2011, carbon dioxide (CO2) accounted
for 84% of total U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
with 97% of those CO2 emissions attributable to energy
use.3 Accordingly, in the United States, “the most direct
way to reduce future climate change is to reduce emissions from the energy sector by using energy more efficiently and switching to lower carbon energy sources.”4
Although the percentages vary, the relationship between
CO2 emissions and energy use sits at the center of efforts
to mitigate climate change across developed and developing countries.
Fundamentally, then, efforts to mitigate climate change
require reducing GHG emissions from the energy sector.
Yet, traditionally, questions of energy and environmental
law have been addressed in separate forums using largely
distinct systems of law and policy. As a result, the intersections between environmental law and energy law and
policy have been approached at the margins. At the domestic level, for example, environmental regulations influence
extraction, transportation, generation, and disposal actions
to significantly different degrees depending on the energy
source (for example, more for coal, less for gas, and even
less for oil). But most sectors of the energy industry continue to receive significant environmental exemptions. This
fragmentation, both within the energy field and between
the energy and environmental fields, means that energy
decisions continue to be made largely in isolation from
larger questions about environmental issues, including climate change.
Similarly, at the international level, international agreements such as the Montreal Protocol influence production
methods and incentivize energy efficiency. On occasion,
the decisions of key institutions such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) address tensions between trade,
energy, and environmental concerns. However, as in the
domestic context, the decisions are piecemeal, and there is
no substantive and meaningful engagement between key
international energy, environmental, and economic institutions about ways in which to coordinate energy decisions
with overarching global climate goals.
The disconnect between climate change and energy is
really a disconnect between merely identifying the problem
of climate change and actually beginning to experiment
with pathways toward mitigating climate change. As the
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) Third
National Climate Assessment concludes, making inroads
likely as not that temperature change will remain below 2°C relative
to pre-industrial levels.

3.	
4.	

Id.
U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), Third National
Climate Assessment 10 (2013), available at http://nca2014.globalchange.
gov/downloads.
Id. at 64.
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into addressing climate change “require[s] substantial
decarbonization of the global economy by the end of this
century, implying a fundamental transformation of the
global energy system.”5 Almost across the board, however,
the short-term costs of efforts to decarbonize are seen as
dwarfing the perceived long-term benefits, as significant as
they might be. Yet, without changes to domestic energy
policies worldwide, global efforts to mitigate climate
change will fail. As one of the co-chairs for AR5’s Working
Group II recently posited, we will instead have to refocus
our energies on managing and, ultimately, surviving climate change.6
However, to accept massive climate change as inevitable
or to allow the costs of responding to climate change to
accumulate exponentially would be to the detriment of
all. In launching the AR5, IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri
cautioned against this approach, warning that “[t]he high
speed mitigation train needs to leave the station very soon,
and all of global society will have to get on board.”7 Critically, all of the mitigation pathways considered in the AR5
involve upscaling of low-carbon energy. In essence, we
must begin mitigating climate change immediately, and
doing so means shifting our energy infrastructure quickly
and dramatically.
Unfortunately, even the most-advanced economies
are still in the early stages of thinking through how to
achieve the types of energy shifts that the IPCC and the
USGCRP Third National Climate Assessment suggest are
necessary to avoid the possibility of increasingly severe climate change impacts.8 Thus, while it is increasingly clear
that significant changes in the energy sector are necessary
to curb climate change, it is less clear that any major state
or regional players know how to achieve those changes
in ways that are technologically, economically, and politically feasible.
However, reform is needed and needed fast. Mitigation
cannot be neglected. Having conversations about mitigation means wrestling with our energy options openly and
often. The stakes are high and we are at a critical moment
in determining our collective future. Confronting the similarly existential crises of nuclear warfare, Albert Camus
famously opined: “We have nothing to lose except everything. So let’s go ahead. This is the wager of our generation.
If we are to fail, it is better, in any case, to have stood on

5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	

Id.
See, e.g., Uri Fiedman & Svati Kristen Narula, The UN’s New Focus: Surviving, Not Stopping, Climate Change, Atlantic, Apr. 1, 2014.
Matt McGrath, World Must End “Dirty” Fuel Use—UN, BBC News, Apr.
13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-27008352.
As the USGCRP’s Third Assessment emphasizes:
The principal types of national actions that could effect such changes include putting a price on emissions, setting regulations and
standards for activities that cause emissions, changing subsidy programs, and direct federal expenditures. Market-based approaches
include cap-and-trade programs that establish markets for trading
emissions permits, analogous to the Clean Air Act provisions for
sulfur dioxide reductions. None of these price-based measures has
been implemented at the national level in the U.S.
USGCRP, Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 3, at 64.
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the side of those who choose life than on the side of those
who are destroying.”9
Climate change is the wager of our generation. We
can choose to do nothing and face an uncertain future,
or we can choose to do something and begin a deliberate revolution—a revolution based on optimism and the
heroic assumption that we are capable of dealing with the
big issues, even when those big issues involve energy and
fundamentally changing our dominant economic model.10

III. Achieving Dramatic Reductions in
GHG Emissions Through Sustainable
Development
This section was authored by John C. Dernbach, Distinguished
Professor of Law at Widener University and Co-Director of
Widener’s Environmental Law Center.
What do we need to do to have a decent chance of preventing large and growing emissions and atmospheric concentrations of GHGs from dangerously interfering with
the climate system? The answer, according to the IPCC, is
that the world needs to reduce GHG emissions by at least
40-70% by 2050, and to zero or below by 2100. Other
scientific reports would say we must proceed faster. The
IPCC also indicates that the many paths to this reduction
should all be guided by sustainable development. That is,
nations must find ways to reduce GHG emissions that also
foster equitable economic and social development and promote security.
The task, then, can be succinctly stated as follows: Starting now, we must rapidly reduce GHG emissions to zero or
below, creating as much social, environmental, economic,
and security benefit as we can, and on an equitable basis.
The IPCC reports do not say so as directly, but that is
among the most essential tasks of our time.

A.

Mitigation

Here is one of the most important paragraphs in the entire
three volumes of the IPCC reports. It appears in Working Group I’s Summary for Policymakers and concerns the
physical science basis for climate change. It is also likely to
be among the densest, most tightly packed paragraphs you
will ever read:
Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2
emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and
>66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861-1880, will
require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic
sources to stay between 0 and about 1570 GtC (5760
GtCO2), 0 and about 1210 GtC (4440 Gt CO2), and 0
and about 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2) since that period,
respectively. These upper amounts are reduced to about
900 GtC (3300 Gt CO2), 820 GtC (3010 GtCO2), and
9.	 Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death: Essays 246 (1960).
10. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law and
Climate Change, __Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L.__ (forthcoming 2015).
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790 GtC (2900 Gt CO2), respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of
515 [445 to 585] GtC (1890 [1630 to 2150] GtCO2), was
already emitted by 2011.11

Got it?
To unpack this, it helps to know that the objective of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) is “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”12 The Conference of the Parties to the Convention
has translated that objective as “a likely chance of holding
the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”13 The period of 1861 to
1880 provides a baseline for pre-industrial levels.
The paragraph specifies three different probabilities of
holding the increase to 2°C (the higher of the two temperatures). The first probability is greater than (>) one out
of three; the second probability is greater than 50:50; and
the third is greater than two out of three. To put these
probabilities in perspective, it helps to recall that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has traditionally
regulated chemicals under its major statutes when they create a risk of cancer of between one in 10,000 and one in 10
million.14 Cancer risks from chemicals are different from
the risks of climate change, of course, but the contrasting
probabilities are striking nonetheless. Even in Russian roulette, a player has only a one-in-six chance of dying.
The entire paragraph is about just one GHG—(CO2)
(more on that later). The acronyms GtC and GtCO2 refer
to gigatons of carbon and gigatons of CO2, respectively.
A gigaton is one billion tons. As the last sentence states,
approximately 515 gigatons of carbon, or 1890 gigatons of
CO2, were already emitted by 2011.
The term “cumulative emissions” refers to all human
(anthropogenic) emissions past, present, and future. In
effect—and this is critical—the paragraph says there is
an overall carbon budget (or CO2 budget) that we cannot
exceed if we want to have a specified chance of holding the
increase to 2°C. To have better than a one-in-three chance,
all human CO2 emissions have to stay below 5,760 gigatons. For a better than 50:50 chance, the figure is 4,440
gigatons. For a better than two-thirds chance, the number
is even lower: 3,670 gigatons.
11. WGI Summary for Policymakers, supra note 1, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
art. 2, May 29, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. U.N.
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 I.L.M. 849.
13. See, e.g., Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.17 (Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action), in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its
Seventeenth Session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the
Parties at Its Seventeenth Session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
14. John D. Graham, The Legacy of One in a Million, Risk in Perspective 1-2 (1993) (Harvard Center for Risk Analysis), available at http://
www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/The-Legacy-of-One-in-a-Million-March-1993.pdf.
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But that is not the whole story, because CO2 is not the
only GHG. When the effect of other GHGs (for example,
methane, nitrous oxide, and certain industrial chemicals)
is taken into account, the numbers become even lower:
3,300 gigatons of CO2 (better than one in three), 3,010
gigatons (better than 50:50), and 2,900 gigatons (better
than two out of three).
Subtracting what was already emitted in 2011 (a calculation not made in the paragraph), we are left with the following: The world cannot emit more than 1,410 additional
gigatons of CO2 (one-in-three chance of not exceeding
2°C), 1,120 additional gigatons (50:50 chance), or 1,010
additional gigatons (two-in-three chance).
That is essentially what the dense paragraph above says.
Working Group III’s Summary for Policymakers
explains both the scale of cuts, and how much time is available, if we are to have a “likely” (two-in-three) chance of
not exceeding 2°C. By its assessment, global GHG emissions need to be 40-70% lower by 2050 and “near zero”
gigatons of CO2 equivalent or “below” by 2100.15
Other calculations of a carbon budget provide less time
to get emissions that low. The writers of a frequently cited
2009 paper in Nature focus on the time period between
2000 and 2050, not between 2000 and 2100, and calculate
carbon budgets to avoid exceeding 2°C based on cumulative emissions in the first half of this century.16 Given past
and projected emissions, they conclude, “we would exhaust
the CO2 emission budget by 2024, 2027 or 2039, depending on the probability accepted for exceeding 2°C (respectively 20%, 25% or 50%).”17
One does not need to be a scientist or a statistician to
judge which of these CO2 budgets gets the timing correct.
A set of normative propositions—all discussed in various
places throughout the IPCC reports18 —are equally applicable to either approach. The precautionary approach,
intergenerational equity, intragenerational equity, human
rights, and basic morality all suggest that we need to
reduce GHG emissions as rapidly as possible to an ultimate goal of zero or below. In fact, the parties to the 2012
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC agreed on the
importance of “accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gases.”19

15. WGIII Summary for Policymakers 13, supra note 2 (footnote and emphasis in first sentence omitted). The term “likely” means a “66-100 %”
chance of a particular outcome. Id. at 4, n.2.
16. Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting
Global Warming to 2 °C, 458 Nature 1158 (2009).
17. Id. at 1159.
18. See, e.g., Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ch. 4 [hereinafter
WGIII AR5] (2014), available at http://report.mitigation2014.org/drafts/
final-draft-postplenary/ipcc_wg3_ar5_final-draft_postplenary_chapter4.
pdf.
19. UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, Advancing the Durban Platform, FCCC/CP/2012/L.13 (Dec. 8, 2012), available at http://www3.
unog.ch/dohaclimatechange/sites/default/files/FCCCCP2012L13.pdf.
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Accelerating Mitigation Through Sustainable
Development

Sustainable development is a decisionmaking framework
to foster human well-being by ensuring that development and environment goals are achieved at the same
time.20 A specific objective of the UNFCCC is sustainable development,21 and the Convention is suffused with
sustainable development principles and language, including precaution,22 equity,23 and, perhaps most importantly,
integrated decisionmaking.24 In fact, the UNFCCC
requires all countries to integrate climate change mitigation and adaptation into their national development plans
and processes.25
Sustainable development offers the only realistic
approach to accelerating the reduction of GHG emissions,
because it would have governments frame their legal and
policy approach not only in terms of reducing emissions,
but also in terms of the social, economic, security, and
environmental benefits that they can obtain by doing so. In
addition, according to the IPCC, articulating the equitable or moral basis for sustainable development approaches
to climate change enhances the likelihood that these
approaches will be agreed to and implemented.26 By creating a space for new approaches to development based on
equity that produce both climate change and non-climate
change benefits, sustainable development provides a way
for public and private decisionmakers in all countries to
get past the seemingly intractable conflict between development and climate change mitigation.
In fact, this policy space is now being filled by a variety of new or modified laws that foster renewable energy;
energy efficiency and conservation in buildings, transportation, and industry; and distributed energy, among other
things. As states discovered more than a decade ago, the
co-benefits of addressing climate change—including new
jobs; growing businesses; reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, mercury, and other air pollutants; and reduced energy
costs for businesses and the poor—produced more immediate and tangible results than the GHG emission reductions that accompanied these benefits.27
Those who draft, modify, advocate, and implement laws
relating to climate change need to look, and are already
looking, for ways of doing so that maximize equity and
co-benefits. Particularly but not exclusively in developed
countries, the greater the co-benefits, the greater GHG
emission reductions that are often politically available. The
task, then, is to craft, adopt, and implement approaches
to reducing GHG emissions that are not only sensible and
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 11-12.
UNFCCC, supra note 12, art. 3.4.
Id. art. 3.3.
Id. art. 3.1.
Id. art. 3.4.
Id. art. 4.1(f ).
WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch. 4 at 4.
See John Dernbach and the Widener University Law School Seminar on
Global Warming, Moving the Climate Debate From Models to Proposed Legislation: Lessons From State Experience, 30 ELR 10933 (Nov. 2000).
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ambitious, but are also so attractive that they will overcome all the many obstacles to change, including not only
fossil fuel interests, but also simple inertia.
To be sure, sustainable development may not work to
address the global problem of climate change. Governments may refuse to enter or treat seriously this new space,
taking unsustainable approaches to mitigation or simply
adhering to conventional development paths and fossil fuels. Alternatively, runaway GHG emissions could so
destabilize governments and societies as to make any prospect for sustainability out of reach. But sustainable development provides an internationally accepted and widely
applied framework for reducing GHGs, and is an attractive
approach for accelerating the reduction of GHG emissions.

IV.

Climate Change, Sustainable
Development, and the Fifth
Assessment Report

This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, William
H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law.
Proponents of sustainable development should be worried by AR5. However, they might not realize that from
the Summaries for Policymakers. Specifically, in Working
Group II’s Summary for Policymakers, related to climate
change adaptation, the IPCC notes that:
Prospects for climate-resilience pathways for sustainable development are related fundamentally to what the
world accomplishes with climate change mitigation (high
confidence). Since mitigation reduces the rate as well as
the magnitude of warming, it also increases the time
available for adaptation to a particular level of climate
change, potentially by several decades. Delaying mitigation may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in
the future.28

On first read, this is a fairly obvious statement. Getting
serious about climate change mitigation now will reduce
humanity’s need to adapt to climate change in the future
and give us more time to adapt overall. However, the last
sentence subtly suggests that delayed mitigation efforts
may reduce humanity’s future options, including options
for development.
The potential loss of future options poses risks to societies and socioecological systems that should already be
modifying how we think about development goals, even
sustainable development goals. All human societies ultimately depend on ecosystems and the goods and services
that those ecosystems provide, but climate change directly
threatens the current states of most of the world’s ecosystems. If you change an ecosystem too much in a bad way,
then you retard the economic and social development
28. IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers 28 (2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.
gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter WGII
Summary for Policymakers].
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(and ultimately survival) of the societies that depend on
that ecosystem.
The climate change extremes of this new reality, such
as the predicted disappearance of island nations as a result
of sea-level rise,29 have been well-publicized, but not yet
incorporated into global development goals. In part, these
kinds of extreme—indeed, existential—threats to island
(and also Arctic) cultures may not seem generalizable.
They are currently generally portrayed as tragic but somewhat unusual climate change fates for particular kinds of
human societies, with the implication that the rest of us
will still be able to muddle along in our pursuit of continuous development.
Ecological dependence, however, is more insidious than
that. In particular, a suite of ecological changes can thoroughly undermine development goals in a particular society
without completely wiping it out. The BBC News recently
published a particularly poignant example of the human
tragedies that can result from ecosystem decline, tracing
how the loss of terrestrial food species and especially freshwater and offshore fisheries has led to increased slavery—
especially child slavery—in Burma, Cambodia, Somalia,
and Thailand.30 Fewer fisheries and other food species
make it highly labor-intensive to get food, promoting the
enslavement of children and others to carry out this task.31
At some point, in other words, a society’s dependence on a
failing or radically changing ecosystem drastically retards,
even reverses, economic and social development. Climate
change is making it all the more likely that a variety of ecosystems will experience such changes, or crash completely.
If you read past the Summary for Policymakers and
dive deep into Chapter 20 of the IPCC’s report on
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, you learn that
“[c]limate change poses a moderate threat to current
sustainable development and a severe threat to future
sustainable development.”32 Thus, although the IPCC
still hews to sustainable development as a global goal,
it acknowledges that climate change could substantially
vitiate that goal. As it notes in its classically reserved tone,
“[a]dded to other stresses such as poverty, inequality, or
diseases, the effects of climate change will make sustainable development objectives such as food and livelihood
security, poverty reduction, health, and access to clean
water more difficult to achieve for many locations, systems, and affected populations.”33

For societies that lose their homelands, food supply, or
water supply, this statement does not go nearly far enough.
Sustainable development goals—indeed, any development
goals—presume that the relevant society will continue to
have the basic ecological requisites for development: a place
to inhabit, a source or sources of food, water that is or can
be made potable. Climate change calls those assumptions
into question and limits the future development options
for current societies, particularly in conjunction with an
ever-rising global human population.
Nor is the potential loss of development options, or
developmental retardation, limited to developing nations.
Europe’s remaining ecosystems cannot support the human
population of that continent at its current levels of affluence. In 2005, the World Wildlife Fund estimated that
Europe’s consumption footprint more than doubles its own
biological productive capacity, and hence “Europe’s wellbeing depends on ecological capacity from elsewhere.”34
The U.S. ecological footprint is even greater. While consumption patterns in Europe and the United States raise
valid climate change issues in their own right, the point
here is much more limited: We cannot assess the U.S. and
European Union’s climate change vulnerability or development futures by looking only at those nations’ capacity to respond to internal climate change impacts. These
two sets of societies are intimately dependent on the health
of ecosystems elsewhere, and climate change impacts on
those ecosystems potentially limit the future options of the
United States and the EU as much as they limit the options
of much more physically proximate societies.
The IPCC, in other words, is just beginning to wrestle with what climate change could truly mean for future
human development, sustainable or otherwise. Notably,
reduced and changing resources alter not only a particular
society’s development options, but also its adaptive capacity, potentially creating a vicious cycle of ever-diminishing
resilience and ability to cope with climate change, let alone
achieve economic or social progress. Clearly, as the IPCC
does emphasize, a strong, immediate, and effective climatechange mitigation strategy is our first-best approach to preserving as many options as possible for the future. Reading
between the lines, however, we should also be starting to
think about what “development goals” can look like in an
option-constrained—and in many places under many scenarios, severely option-limited—future.

V.
29. See, e.g., Climate Change: The “Greatest Threat” to the Peoples of the Pacific, Island Bus., July 31, 2014, http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/
palau/5906/climate-change-the-greatest-threat-to-the-peoples-/.
30. Matt McGrath, Global Decline of Wildlife Linked to Child Slavery, BBC News,
July 24, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28463036.
31. Id.
32. Fatima Denton et al., Chapter 20: Climate-Resilient Pathways: Adaptation,
Mitigation, and Sustainable Development 2 (Oct. 2013), in IPCC, Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2014), Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the International Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter WGII AR5],
ch. 20 (2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap20_FGDall.pdf.
33. Id.
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Responding to Imminent Risks and
Present Harms

This section was authored by Shannon Roesler, Professor of
Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers regarding
climate impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability identifies a
34. World Wildlife Fund, Europe 2005: The Ecological Footprint 3
(2005), available at http://www2.wwf.fi/wwf/www/uploads/pdf/ekologinen_jalanjalki_june05.pdf.
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number of imminent risks: Some unique and threatened
systems, including ecosystems and cultures, are already at
risk from climate change (high confidence). . . .
Climate-change-related risks from extreme events, such as
heat waves, extreme precipitation, and coastal flooding,
are already moderate (high confidence). . . .
Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater
for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at
all levels of development.35

These quotations come from three of the five “reasons
for concern” identified by the IPCC in its Third Assessment Report as “starting point[s] for evaluating dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”36 In a
report that understandably focuses much attention on the
heightened probability and magnitude of harm associated
with further warming in the future, the risks identified
in the first two quotations stand out because they already
exist. Some communities, including coastal villages in the
Arctic and small island states, are already facing threats to
their very existence. In addition, the risks associated with
extreme weather events are widespread and already here.
When these risks are considered alongside the reality that
they are “unevenly distributed” and “generally greater for
disadvantaged people,” they present policy questions not
only about long-term adaptation planning, but also about
immediate disaster response and aid.
In cases where communities are under serious threat
from coastal erosion and sea-ice melt, the threat is imminent and the costs are steep. For example, in 2003, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported
that coastal erosion and flooding had affected 184 of 213
Alaska Native communities.37 In 2009, the GAO reported
that 31 Native villages face “imminent threats” and that 12
of the 31 villages had decided to relocate or consider partial
or complete relocation.38 Given the rapid rate of warming
in the Arctic, the number of villages facing an imminent
threat is likely higher today than it was in 2009.
These threats result in real and quantifiable current costs.
In 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
estimated the costs of relocating the Alaska Native village
of Newtok at $80-$130 million.39 Estimates of the costs
to relocate other villages are either comparable or much
higher. For example, it could cost as much as $400 million
to move the inhabitants of the village of Kivalina.40 Even
though Alaska Native communities are generally small
(ranging from a couple to several hundred people), they are
located in remote areas often accessible year-round only by
airplane, a reality that makes relocation extremely expen35. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 12.
36. Id.
37. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-09-551, Alaska
Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating
Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion 12 (2009).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 29.
40. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
869, 39 ELR 20236 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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sive. The costs will only grow as flooding and coastal erosion pose increasing threats to homes, infrastructure, and
the way of life in more of these communities.
Funding to relocate these villages must come from
somewhere other than the local communities. Most Alaska
Native villages are self-sustaining communities closely tied
to the sea and river ecosystems where they hunt and fish for
food. Federal funding is essential, but villages often fail to
qualify for the disaster-mitigation programs administered
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
A village may lack a FEMA-approved disaster-mitigation plan, which is a prerequisite for mitigation funding,
and even if such a plan is in place, it does not guarantee
funding.41 FEMA makes funding decisions based on the
cost-effectiveness of a project, and the high costs of new
infrastructure (in comparison to the small numbers of people relocated) make relocation projects costly.42 In addition,
the nature of the risk (in this case, gradual coastal erosion)
may frustrate attempts to obtain a federal disaster declaration, and serious obstacles prevent many villages from
participating in the National Flood Insurance Program.43
In addition to the difficulty in qualifying for federal
disaster funding, these villages also face serious challenges
in the planning and decisionmaking phases of relocation.
Decisions regarding relocation depend on the coordination of efforts by local, state, and federal authorities. The
impacts of gradual coastal erosion and flooding are not
governed by one federal or state agency.44 Federal funding
may be administered by multiple agencies, including the
Corps, FEMA, and the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Without clear structures for information-sharing and coordination, decisionmaking is inefficient at best. Indeed, the authors of the IPCC report on
climate impacts note that “limited integration or coordination of governance” can hinder adaptation efforts.45
Given the considerable difficulties in obtaining governmental assistance, it is not surprising that one Alaska
Native village recently turned to the courts for relief. In
2008, the village of Kivalina sued oil, energy, and utility
companies in federal district court, alleging that the defendants’ GHG emissions have caused global warming, which
is, in turn, causing massive coastal erosion and increasing
the risks of extreme weather and flooding.46 On appeal,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal, concluding that under U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, claims for damages pursuant to
the federal common law of public nuisance are displaced
by the Clean Air Act (CAA).47 The majority concluded its
opinion by acknowledging the seriousness of the problem,
but characterizing it as one not amenable to judicial action:
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See GAO, Alaska Native Villages, supra note 37, at 22.
See id. at 22-23.
See id. at 23-24.
See id. at 36.
WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 26.
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863.
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858, 42
ELR 20195 (9th Cir. 2012). The Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
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“Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which
itself is being displaced by the rising sea. But the solution to
Kivalina’s dire circumstance must rest in the hands of the
legislative and executive branches of government, not the
federal common law.”48
Of course, given the interests involved, a complete political solution to Kivalina’s “dire circumstance” is unlikely.
Congress is not likely to appropriate the millions of dollars
required to relocate the village. But perhaps more modest
goals are within reach. A combination of legislative and
executive actions could address coordination problems,
making the administration of available funds more efficient and effective. Revision of current disaster-assistance
laws and policies may remove some obstacles that villages
face when applying for federal assistance.
Furthermore, although any response to the problem is
likely to be a political one, civil litigation may nevertheless
have a role to play. Plaintiffs will have difficulty establishing the required legal elements, including the causal link
between climate-related harms and the conduct (GHG
emissions) of specific defendants. But as social movement
activists and scholars have long recognized, even unsuccessful lawsuits can serve important functions. They often
capture media and public attention and provide a means
by which to communicate grievances to the larger political
society and to shape the discussion of critical issues.
In fact, Kivalina’s lawsuit may have had such an effect.
The village’s story is often recounted in news articles and
scholarly commentary, and in many cases, the focus is on
governmental accountability, rather than private liability.
For example, one news account quotes a Kivalina Council
leader’s description of the problem as one of political injustice: “‘The U.S. government imposed this Western lifestyle
on us, gave us their burdens and now they expect us to pick
everything up and move it ourselves. What kind of government does that?’”49 As the Ninth Circuit opinion suggests,
this is a question best addressed to the political branches
of government, ideally acting in response to shared commitments in the larger political society. The lawsuit may
have helped educate the public and even played a role in
framing the relevant questions; perhaps future litigation
can help ensure that we keep the conversation going and
identify solutions sooner rather than later. The threats to
these communities are not theoretical or distant; they are
already here.

VI. Security Regained, Security Lost?
The Climate Change Conundrum
This section was authored by Deepa Badrinarayana, Professor,
Chapman University, Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
Consider the following definition, quotation, and Working Group II empirical claims:
48. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
49. Stephen Sackur, The Alaskan Village Set to Disappear Under Water in a
Decade, BBC News Mag., July 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/
magazine-23346370.
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From the Oxford English Dictionary: “Security: The state
of being free from danger or threat. . . . Origin: late middle English: from Old French securite or Latin securitas
from securus ‘free from care’.”50
From the United Nations: “We need another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security to
human security.”51
From Working Group III: All aspects of food security are
potentially affected by climate change, including food
access, utilization, and price stability (high confidence).
Climate change over the 21st century is projected to
increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high
agreement).
Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent
conflicts in the form of civil war and inter-group violence
by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts
such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence).
The impacts of climate change on the critical infrastructure and territorial integrity of many states are expected
to influence national security policies (medium evidence,
medium agreement).52

In 1945, nations that came together to establish the
United Nations (U.N.) had one clear goal: to remove the
scourge of war, two of which had debilitated a significant
portion of the world. The U.N. had a singular mission: to
maintain peace and security.53 The Security Council was
established as the decisionmaking body to address security
threats.54 However, nations also realized the importance of
international cooperation, the need to achieve economic
growth, and the need to protect social and cultural structures, while at the same time protecting human rights and
ensuring justice. They vested in the U.N. the responsibility to foster good international relations among nations.55
Implicit in this structure was a confidence that secure
nations with sound socioeconomic and political structures
would cater to the needs of their citizens.
In 1994, nations heralded the end of another “war,” the
Cold War. By then, the world was a much different place.
Security of nations in the traditional territorial sense no
longer occupied center stage. Rather, the state of people
within nations gained focus, and that focus was on human
security. The U.N. Development Programme, in its 1994
Human Development Report, introduced an endless list
of human security concerns that warranted international
attention—from energy to food to displacement of people
to water scarcity to human rights abuses to any aspect of
50. Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/english/security (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
51. U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994
(New York: United States, 1994), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
52. WGII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 8.
53. U.N. Charter, available at www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.
shtml.
54. Id. art. 7.
55. U.N. Charter, supra note 53.
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human integrity and well-being. Human security, however, did not gain the center stage in international law in
the same way as national security, with the exception of
international intervention in internal civil wars in some
nations. After all, why should international law have a role
in purely domestic matters? Instead, subnational and nongovernment entities that began to mushroom in the 1990s,
plus individuals, made an effort to fill the gap left by international law by creating networks to influence laws, create
policies, and/or to implement solutions.56
Climate change triggers traditional national security
and human security concerns. According to AR5, climate
change can increase human security concerns, as well as
national security concerns, including concerns about security in property. The establishment of climate security
organizations composed of retired military generals signals the gravity of the security threats that climate change
presents. In the United States, identified national security
threats include everything from threats to military installations from sea-level rise to international competition for
natural resources in the Arctic region.57 Human security
threats also abound: loss of food resources; displacement
of people; loss of livelihood; civil war; and loss of property,
to name a few.
Yet, the security risks of climate change have failed to
catalyze international legal response. Major GHG emitters
are instead using arguments of human security to avoid
international legal obligations. The United States has been
arguing that it will suffer competition loss that could result
in loss of livelihood if it enters into a treaty that does not
bind China to similar obligations. Australia, Canada,
Japan, and Russia have joined in this viewpoint for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. China and
India have been arguing that the short-term needs of their
citizens, from energy to food to other basic needs, require
them to develop without emissions reduction obligations.
For these nations, the short-term security needs of their
peoples come before their long-term interests.
There are those nations, however, that face both shortterm and long-term security risks. Small island nations
whose territorial integrity is challenged by rising sea levels face physical threat to their borders. However, despite
acknowledgment of security threats by the United States
and other nations, there is no international action on
this issue. Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol
uses the word “security.” Instead, nations are focusing on
building national resilience to climate change impacts.58
56. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 15-16 (2004); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002);
Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Activists Beyond Borders (1998).
57. Center for Climate & Security, Secretary Hagel on Climate Change Affecting the Security Environment, Oct. 12, 2014, http://climateandsecurity.org/2014/10/12/secretary-hagel-on-climate-change-affecting-thesecurity-environment/.
58. U.S. Department of Defense, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation
Roadmap (2014), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprin t.pdf.
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The implicit message appears to be that the U.N. mandate to maintain peace and security is limited to threats
from traditional “war-like” aggression. Of course, even if
the U.N. Security Council were to undertake this matter,
what would a permanent membership composed of United
States and China decide that might be different from their
stance on climate change treaty obligations?
For some other nations, such as sub-Saharan African
nations, climate change presents nearly insurmountable
risks to human security—food insecurity, water scarcity,
livelihood insecurity, and property insecurity. However,
these insecurities already exist in these countries. The difference between some of these countries and emerging
economies like China and India is that the sub-Saharan
African nations are not in a place of economic development
that apparently promises to address short-term human
security needs. They are also not in a position to mitigate
climate change.
Finally, there are a group of countries, oil-producing
nations such as the Middle East nations, that face their
own security issues. Climate change may disrupt their
long-term security, but mitigation efforts could upend
their short-term security, because of their limited economic
portfolio, primarily in fossil fuels.
The world viewed from the lens of climate security is
a mismatch of national interests and security concerns. It
begs the question of whether economic growth or reversal of
the current economic system can ensure security, especially
in a world divided by physical boundaries but united by
one atmosphere. Just as climate change itself poses different kinds of security risks in different nations, so, too, does
actually dealing with climate change. As a result, it is time
to rethink the international law framework—period—in
order to deal with these very real security complexities.

VII. Approaching Climate Change Through
Systems Thinking
This section was authored by Keith H. Hirokawa, Professor of
Law, Albany Law School.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers identifies natural and built infrastructure challenges as crucial to
an adaptation strategy, as follows:
Climate change will have profound impacts on a broad
spectrum of infrastructure systems (water and energy supply, sanitation and drainage, transport and telecommunication), services (including health care and emergency
services), the built environment, and ecosystem services.
These interact with other social, economic, and environmental stressors exacerbating and compounding risks to
individual and household well-being (medium confidence
based on high agreement, medium evidence).59

In this statement, the Working Group identifies the
wide range of social, economic, and environmental assets
59. WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch. 8 at 3.
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and responsibilities that will be challenged by climate
changes. For our purposes, it is significant that the IPCC
chose to associate the costs of sustaining infrastructure and
services with the built environment and ecosystem services.
My observation is simple: If infrastructure and the built
environment are to be sustainable in the face of climate
changes—if it will have the capacity to meet the social,
economic, and environmental necessities of our time and
over time—then an understanding of ecological services
must be incorporated into infrastructure and built environment planning. Sound decisions about infrastructure
and public services cannot be made without considering
the relationship between essential services provision and
ecosystem structure and function.
Consider, for example, water infrastructure. Water
infrastructure provides clean and sufficient water for drinking, as well as other water-intensive uses such as irrigated
agriculture and industry; transports water to where it is
needed; treats waste and stormwater; handles storm surges
and provides safety from such surges; and also provides recreational and community opportunities. The water system
provides these services through the construction of an artificial system of physical capture and conveyance, storage,
and treatment. The system’s strength is assessed by volume
provision and miles of pipe.
That water infrastructure is addressed in climate change
planning is no small thing: Without an effective infrastructure, individuals may be unable to obtain basic needs,
and the consequences will be catastrophic. Of course, public access to adequate water is often difficult to ensure. As
such, the IPCC statement acknowledges the immense cost
of infrastructure maintenance and replacement into the
next century, as well as the “profound” importance that
civil society effectively plan for scarcity and challenges
to the provision of basic human needs. It is of significant
consequence that this observation arises in the context of
urban resilience. As Alexandra Klass notes in the section
immediately below, a shift toward urbanization that began
over one century ago continues and even accelerates into
the next century.
Society is becoming more urbanized, and human population is becoming more concentrated and, accordingly,
efficient and effective provision of public essential services
has become paramount. These changes require that governance prioritize planning to overcome the significant
challenges faced in meeting infrastructure needs in human
population centers. The challenges are real with regard
to physical and financial projections. According to one
estimate, the average cost of water infrastructure replacement in the developed world will range from $550-$2,300
to $6,300 per household for smaller systems, and up to
$10,000 per household if treatment plants and pumps
need replacement. In the meantime, the useful life of water
infrastructure has declined: The average life expectancy
for gray infrastructure has decreased from 120 years (for
systems features installed in the late 1800s) down to 75
years for post-World War II infrastructure. The staggered
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life expectancies of water infrastructure components makes
financing infrastructure more complicated, including equitably allocating scarce resources to the replacement where
and when systems come to the end of their useful life.
The foregoing example suggests the capture of substantial benefits from combining our assessment of necessary
infrastructure with an inventory of ecosystem services.
Ecosystem services is an approach to ecology and economics that focuses on ecosystem processes and ecosystem
functionality.60 This approach values the manner in which
ecosystems produce goods of value, the manner in which
ecosystems provide services that are essential to human
well-being, and the economic value that can be attributed
to functioning ecosystems as the value of the services they
provide. The change in thinking toward ecosystem services
is a monumental move toward climate change preparedness. Consider two realizations that come with ecosystem
services thinking: (1) we have typically displaced and interrupted ecosystems to build infrastructure systems and the
built environment; and (2) built infrastructure does not last
forever. Ecosystem services thinking offers an additional
opportunity in infrastructure planning that envisions flexibility, adaptive reasoning, and risk analysis. Ecosystem
services thinking requires us to identify the ways that we
rely on functioning ecosystems for clean air and water,
temperature control, nutrient cycling, spiritual grounding,
and a host of other services that are so essential to life that
they often cannot be artificially replaced.
The thrust of ecosystem services thinking is that we
need to break from commodity-based valuation. By focusing attention on the market values of goods that can be
taken from ecosystems, without also accounting for the
methods of sustaining the production of those goods or
the loss of production in the future, we have expedited the
decline of functionality throughout the natural systems.
Both consumption and the corresponding inattention to
ecosystem functions that occurs in the commodification of
nature have limited the ability of ecosystems to regenerate
and sustain themselves, requiring the production of substitutes. From this perspective, a resilient water infrastructure
system will recognize the role that natural systems play in
producing clean and sufficient water (rivers, lakes, streams,
groundwater aquifers, floodplains, floodways, wetlands,
and the watersheds), and will integrate those processes in
formulating the means to capture, treat, store, and deliver
water to places it is needed.
Switching to an ecosystem services accounting, or at
least incorporating ecosystem services into the infrastructure accounting, will produce better planning decisions.
Examples of the benefits of ecosystem services planning are
illustrated in the watershed investments in New York City
and Seattle, where the acquisition of real property interests
throughout the watershed has captured the value of eco60. See, e.g., Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of
the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 Nature 253 (1997);
Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable Development, 6 Conservation Biology 37 (1992).
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system services in providing quality and quantity of public
water supplies; or Santa Fe, which is currently identifying
forest management practices that will facilitate the capture
of watershed service from the ecosystem and help avoid the
gargantuan costs of losing such services from forest fires
and other events.
These cities are investing in ecosystem functionality
to ensure that watersheds are performing as they can and
should, at a fraction of the cost of built infrastructure, and
as a minimal maintenance cost over time. The cities have
incorporated the wisdom of ecosystem services: The built
or gray infrastructure that comprise their water systems
are designed to provide services that are already provided
by natural systems, including water and sewer, storm and
flood protection, temperature control and climate stabilization, waste cycling and assimilation, and other natural
services. As an additional benefit, natural systems provide
these services very effectively and efficiently, while also
securing other foundational goods and services, including
oxygen, water, land, recreational opportunities, aesthetic
value and spiritual attachment, and energy.
Although ecosystem services planning is a new
approach, it is essential that water managers incorporate
ecosystem services concepts into the decisionmaking process. The result of such an integration would be to capture
the benefits of functioning ecosystems, while protecting
the valuable assets of natural capital. Ecosystem services
thinking connects ecosystem function with basic human
needs—not merely as a means to protect the environment,
but as a means to assure human well-being.
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There has been little systematic assessment on their
implementation, the extent to which emission reduction

targets are being achieved, or emissions reduced. Current
climate action plans focus largely on energy efficiency.
Fewer climate action plans consider land use planning
strategies and cross-sectoral measures to reduce sprawl
and promote transit-oriented development.63 The urbanization of the world and the impact of that urbanization
on GHG emissions are significant. Today, more than onehalf the global population is urban, as compared to only
13% in 1900.64 By 2050, the global urban population is
expected to increase by 2.5-3.0 billion, corresponding
to nearly 70% of the world’s population.65 Today, urban
areas account for approximately 75% of global energy use
and the same amount of CO2 emissions from global energy.66 Moreover, the majority of future urban population
growth will take place in small- or medium-size urban
areas in developing countries.67
There is both potential and risk with this type of growth.
Because such development will be mostly new, there is the
potential to create buildings, other infrastructure, transportation, and land use plans that maximize efficiency
and reduce GHG emissions from the outset, as opposed
to having to retrofit existing buildings, infrastructure, and
transportation networks. On the other hand, because most
of this urban growth will be in developing countries, there
is the risk that lack of political will, coupled with limited
institutional and financial capacity, will result in low-efficiency buildings and infrastructure and urban sprawl.
As noted in the AR5, thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, raising the issue of what kind of
GHG emissions cities can actually control. According to
the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), the factors
that contribute to statewide per-capita GHG emissions
(and thus impact urban GHG emissions) include climate
(significant cold or hot weather results in more energyrelated emissions in urban areas), the structure of the state
economy (energy-producing economies are more carbonintensive), population density, energy sources, building
standards, and explicit state policies to reduce emissions.
With regard to these factors, cities have little control
over their baseline climate, although planners of new cities
can attempt to concentrate development in more moderate regions. Cities have some but not significant control
over whether they build their economies on energy production or on non-energy-producing activities such as finance,
higher education, or high-tech industries. Energy-producing economies are tied to the physical location of energy
resources, which means cities near energy resources will
generally base their economies on development of those
resources, leading to greater GHG emissions. But cities
can choose to focus on other economic drivers, such as
high-tech or higher education, if they create the amenities
to draw the target companies and workers to those cities.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is an example of a city that has

61. IPCC, AR5, Mitigation of Climate Change, ch. 12: Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning 7 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC,
Mitigation of Climate Change]; WGIII: Summary for Policymakers,
supra note 2, at 26.
62. WGIII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 27.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

VIII. Climate Change and Cities
This section was authored by Alexandra B. Klass, Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
For the first time in 2014, in AR5’s volume on mitigation of climate change, the IPCC included a separate chapter, Chapter 12, entitled Human Settlements,
Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning. According to the
IPCC, “[s]ince the publication of the Fourth Assessment
Report, there has been a growing recognition of the significant contribution of urban areas to GHG [greenhouse
gas] emissions, their potential role in mitigating them,
and a multi-fold increase in the corresponding scientific
literature.”61 In both Chapter 12 of the Mitigation of Climate Change volume and the Summary for Policymakers
for that volume, the IPCC concludes:
Thousands of Cities are undertaking climate action plans,
but their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement).62

IPCC, Mitigation of Climate Change, ch. 12, at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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made a significant effort in recent decades to transition
from an energy-intensive economy (coal mining and steel
manufacturing) to one based on higher education, medicine, and high-tech industries.
Cities also have some, and increasingly significant, control over the energy sources they use for heating and electricity. Although state public utility commissions and state
legislatures make many of the primary decisions regarding energy use in the state, cities are increasingly choosing to limit their use of coal and other fossil fuels and to
shift their energy uses to natural gas and renewable energy.
Chicago, Illinois, is an example of a city that has made a
policy choice to reduce coal in its electricity mix and rely
much more heavily on renewable energy by promoting an
“electric aggregation” program, whereby it enters into longterm power purchase agreements with electricity suppliers on behalf of its citizens. By negotiating a new price for
all of its residents under one contract, Chicago can use its
bargaining power to lower electricity rates and/or demand
certain types of generation like wind, solar, and natural gas
and eliminate or reduce reliance on coal.
Cities have even more control over building efficiencies, density, and mass transit, all of which have significant
impacts on urban GHG emissions. While it is difficult
to make major changes to existing building efficiency,
transportation infrastructure, and density because such
investments are prone to “lock-in” of energy and emissions pathways, many European and Asian cities and even
some U.S cities that have a long history of high density
and excellent mass transit are good examples for future
urban development.
But many city efforts in this area have focused on the
energy efficiency of buildings. This is not surprising as
buildings are a major contributor to GHG emissions and
a source of such emissions over which cities have significant control. In the United States, buildings account for
39% of total energy use and 68% of electricity use. As a
result, increasing the efficiency of electricity use in buildings has the potential to reduce overall energy use, leading to decreased energy costs, reduced need to build more
power plants, greater energy security, and significant environmental protection benefits. The consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates that $520 billion invested in
non-transportation energy efficiency in the United States
by 2020 could generate energy savings worth over $1.2
trillion, reduce end-use energy demand by 23% of current
projections, and as a co-benefit provide over 1.1 billion tons
of GHG reductions.68 On a global scale, of course, these
benefits multiply exponentially.
U.S. cities are beginning to enact innovative policies
to “benchmark” commercial buildings by collecting, disclosing, and analyzing building energy consumption data.
With such data, cities can encourage market transactions
that allow more efficient buildings to benefit, shape energyefficient behavior of building owners, and learn from that
68. McKinsey & Co., Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy
iii (July 2009).
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data to shape future city policies and guide building construction policies in the new cities that will inevitably result
from the urbanization of the world’s population.
The cities of Austin, Texas; Minneapolis, Minnesota;
New York City; Seattle, Washington; and Washington,
D.C., all impose some form of benchmarking requirements
on commercial buildings and mandate some information
disclosure to local governments or prospective buyers to
increase demand for energy-efficient buildings. Nevertheless, even though this is one area where cities have significant regulatory authority, barriers to collecting such data
as a result of public utility privacy policies and sometimes
state public utility commission privacy policies make the
data collection difficult. For instance, some public utilities
do not provide such data in a uniform format that can be
easily analyzed by customers or third parties. State privacy
laws also can pose a barrier to accessible energy consumption data because they direct the utilities to disclose such
data only in highly aggregated form that makes it difficult for third-party energy-efficiency providers or policymakers to determine trends, recommend energy-efficiency
improvements, or otherwise analyze the data for research
or consulting purposes. Some states, such as California,
are in the process of developing rules to balance any privacy interests in energy consumption data with the need to
make such data available to shape energy-efficiency policies
and allow cities to make GHG reductions in their building
stock. But most states have no policies in place at all and
thus are limiting the ability of cities to engage in GHG
mitigation in the areas in which they would otherwise have
the most authority to act.
In sum, cities will play an increasingly significant role
in contributing to worldwide GHG emissions, but also
have the potential to make major contributions to GHG
mitigation efforts with the right policies in place. In order
to realize that potential, however, cities must be given the
tools to collect, analyze, and use energy consumption data
to improve building efficiency. If cities are able to make
strides in this area, their research and policies can serve as
models for the cities of the future.

IX. Urban Community Collaborative
This section was authored by Jonathan Rosenbloom, Associate
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
Working Group II, discussing impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability, makes the following empirical claim:
Coordinated support from higher levels of governments,
the private sector and civil society and horizontal learning through networks of cities and practitioners benefits
urban adaptation (medium confidence based on medium
agreement, medium evidence).69

Unfortunately, Working Group II (and the other Working Groups) provided little detail as to what it envisioned
as “horizontal learning” or a “network of cities” and how
69. WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch. 8.
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they may benefit urban adaptation. Working Group II also
omitted this statement from its Summary for Policymakers.
Because I interpret the statement as referring, in part, to
self-coordinated collective action among urban communities throughout the world, and because I believe an urban
community collaborative has the potential to be a powerful and realistic alternative in mitigating and adapting
to climate change, this section considers what an urban
community collaborative could look like and the potential
it holds. My hope is that the IPCC continues to increase
its recognition of urban centers and the cumulative impact
they may have when collaborating to reduce GHG emissions. As part of this, the IPCC should include the statement above or a similar one pertaining to self-coordinated
collective action among urban communities in its future
reports and, at a minimum, discuss the possibilities and
challenges of an urban community collaborative.70
The AR5 reiterates many facts that indicate the importance and relevance of urban areas in the debate on climate change, including continued population growth and
continued increase in the amount of emissions originating
from urban areas. The Report notes the need for cities to
mitigate and adapt to climate changing conditions,71 while
also noting significant obstacles to achieving adaptation or
mitigation, including a lack of local resources.72
From an urban governance perspective, bridging the
gap between action on climate change and the making
of day-to-day policies at the local level is as complex as it
is critical to reducing GHG emissions. Bridging this gap
includes overcoming deficiencies in financial and human
capital, lack of information concerning the challenges and
possible solutions, and other operational and legal obstacles. For example, there are likely few local governments
that have the time or resources necessary to analyze the
IPCC’s Report and ponder adequate responses to it. Even if
a local government had the time and resources, it would be
inefficient for thousands of local governments to research
and draft policies when many of those local governments
are confronting similar challenges that can be addressed
with similar solutions.
One way to help move from the Report to implementation at the local level is through an urban community
collaborative in which local governments horizontally
coordinate and agree to enact coordinated, legally bind70. The IPCC’s Synthesis Report of the Fifth Assessment Report devotes an entire
section to subnational action on climate change (4.4.2), although it only
gives a passing mention to subnational collaborations in Section 4.4.2.2:
Sub-national climate policies are increasingly prevalent, both in
countries with national policies and in those without. These policies include state and provincial climate plans combining market,
regulatory and information instruments, and sub-national cap-andtrade systems. In addition, transnational cooperation has arisen
among sub-national actors, notably among institutional investors,
NGOs seeking to govern carbon offset markets, and networks of
cities seeking to collaborate in generating low-carbon urban development. [13.5.2, 15.2.4, 15.8]
71. Id. at 3 (“Action in urban centres is essential to successful global climate
change adaptation”); WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch. 4 (noting the importance of “bottom-up approaches, engaging participation of diverse countries
and actors, creating procedurally equitable forms of decentralization”).
72. WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch. 8 at 4-6.
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ing policies to reduce GHG emissions. These policies
could go far beyond the climate action reports mentioned
by the IPCC. They could include a diverse and detailed
array of local functions ranging from local procurement
policies to school lunch programs to zoning and building codes. Reviewing the many aspects of local governance that affect GHG emissions and reconsidering how
to amend policies to lower emissions across functions is
a gargantuan task. However, if that task is spread among
the thousands of local governments, it may not only be
more manageable to a single local government, but it also
may be more efficient and help expedite the reduction of
GHG emissions.
There are several groups collaborating around local
governments that work to facilitate a reduction in GHG
emissions, including the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,73 C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,74 United Cities & Local Governments,75 and
ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability.76 None of
these, however, place binding obligations on local governments or have enforcement mechanisms. They are predominantly focused on voluntarily sharing best practices and
information on climate change. While obviously helpful
in moving cities forward, it is not surprising that the IPCC
found that “[t]housands of Cities are undertaking climate
action plans, but their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement).”77
While a successful urban community collaborative
could take many forms, at a minimum, it would likely
require local governments to have: (1) legal authority at
the international, national, and subnational levels to enter
into an urban community collaborative; (2) recognition of
an affirmative obligation to mitigate climate change that
cannot be abrogated by higher levels of authority (international, national, and subnational); and (3) the political
will to set binding obligations and to enforce standards to
reduce free-riding and minimize leakage.
There are no doubt legal, political, and logistical challenges to each of these three (not the least of which involves
national sovereignty and legal supremacy). And I understand the significance of the matching principle and the
virtues of having an international body address a global
issue such as climate change. But if the international community is unable to act and there is a willingness among
local governments to act, then why not allow them to do
so? Even if the international community is able to act, having both cities and nations work to lower GHG emissions
73. U.S. Conference of Mayors, Climate Protection Agreement, http://www.
usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).
74. C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, C40, http://www.c40.org/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014).
75. United Cities & Local Governments, Global Network of Cities, Local
and Regional Governments, http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014).
76. ICLEI Global-Local Governments for Sustainability, Sustainable
City, http://www.iclei.org/our-activities/our-agendas/sustainable-city.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
77. WGIII: Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 7.
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and climate change impacts would be a positive and morecomprehensive approach.
On the one hand, urban areas, as large global emitters
that may be fractured and divided, represent a massive
tragedy of the commons collective action problem. On
the other hand, they represent an enormous opportunity
to self-coordinate78 and sustainably manage their GHG
emissions. A collaborative of only the 20 largest cities by
population, for example, would represent more people
than any other country, except China, India, and the
United States.
As the IPCC notes, there are numerous local governments individually taking steps to mitigate climate change.
It is not enough for the international, national, and subnational governments to verbally (and, at times, financially)
support local efforts. They need to provide local governments with the legal authority to collaborate and to multijurisdictionally regulate climate change. Without some
type of sharing of resources and coordinated efforts, it
seems too large of a task to ask thousands of urban areas
to translate the AR5 report into local action. While not all
cities are willing or prepared to address climate change,
those that are willing or prepared represent an untapped
opportunity to reduce GHG emissions. The international
community should make it a priority for these cities to
horizontally coordinate to sustainably manage the climate
change challenges they are facing.

X.

Big Box Resiliency: U.S. Suburbs and
Climate Change

This section was authored by Sarah Adams-Schoen, Assistant
Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center and Director of the Institute on Land Use & Sustainable Development Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers includes
the following empirical claims:
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat
waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal
significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems
and many human systems to current climate variability
(very high confidence). Impacts of such climate-related
extremes include alteration of ecosystems, disruption of
food production and water supply, damage to infrastructure and settlements, morbidity and mortality, and consequences for mental health and human well-being. For
countries at all levels of development, these impacts are
consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for current climate variability in some sectors.79
In North America, governments are engaging in incremental adaptation assessment and planning, particularly
at the municipal level. Some proactive adaptation is occur-

78. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990).
79. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 6 (footnote omitted).
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ring to protect longer-term investments in energy and
public infrastructure.80

These statements hint at a failure across all levels of government in the United States—specifically, a significant
gap between vulnerabilities and preparedness. Although
the Summary for Policymakers recognizes the greater
efforts of U.S. municipal governments, as compared to
federal and state governments, U.S. municipalities still lag
behind their counterparts throughout the world.
Living on Long Island, New York—home to the first
planned suburb—I am reminded that suburbs pose their
own challenges with respect to climate change. Although
the distinct characteristics of suburbs may be appropriately
outside the purview of the IPCC,81 recognizing these characteristics, and the legal context within which they occur,
is essential for effective preparedness in the United States.
In this country, the majority of the population resides in
suburbs, suburbs have a higher per-capita carbon footprint
than urban areas, and suburbs are less likely to take action
on climate change.82
Suburban communities need encouragement and support to assess their climate vulnerabilities, plan and implement adaptation and mitigation strategies, and, in some
cases, expand their current efforts beyond building and
vehicle initiatives to land use and planning measures.83 As
one commentator has noted, “[S]o far, climate action has
extended slowly to suburbia. Central cities in smart growth
states have taken on climate change, but vast swaths of
metropolitan suburbia continue to reproduce a political
geography of local free-riding.”84
The AR5 highlights the importance of “city and municipal governments acting now to incorporate climate change
adaptation into their development plans and policies and
infrastructure investments,”85 characterizing “[a]ction in
urban centres [as] essential to successful global climate
change adaptation.”86 Additionally, the AR5 finds that
“[u]rban adaptation action that delivers mitigation cobenefits is a powerful, resource-efficient means to address
climate change and to realize sustainable development
goals (medium confidence based on high agreement, medium
evidence).”87 The role of urban areas, including their suburbs, “includes not only building [a] foundation of resilience . . . but also mobilizing new resources, adjusting
80. Id. at 8.
81. As used in the AR5, the term “urban” appears to encompass suburbs. See
WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch. 8 at 6, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
report/ar5/wg2/.
82. John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground
to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 3-4
(2009).
83. Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for Small
and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International Networks, 22 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 395, 440 (2012).
84. Yonn Dierwechter, Metropolitan Geographies of U.S. Climate Action: Cities,
Suburbs, and the Local Divide in Global Responsibilities, 12 J. Envtl. Pol’y
& Plan. 59, 79 (2010); Osofsky, supra note 83.
85. WGII AR5, supra note 32, ch. 8 at 6.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id.
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building and land-use regulations and continuously developing the local capacity to respond.”88
Despite this critical role, climate adaptation planning
appears to be a lower priority in the United States than
just about anywhere else.89 According to a survey administered in 2011, the United States has the lowest percentage
of cities pursuing adaptation planning out of all regions
surveyed (59%), while Latin American and Canadian cities have the highest (95% and 92%, respectively).90 The
United States also has the lowest percentage of cities that
have completed an assessment of their vulnerabilities and
risks (13%).91
Local governments throughout the United States need
more federal and state support.92 State law delegates much
of the authority relevant to climate change adaptation and
mitigation to municipal governments, and yet state and
federal policy fails to support local governments in this role
through adequate funding and technical support.93
To provide adequate guidance and support to local communities, state and federal governments need to take into
consideration the context of those communities. Indeed,
the Summary for Policymakers found that “[a]daptation
is place- and context-specific, with no single approach
for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (high
confidence).”94 Moreover, effective adaptation planning and
implementation, as well as mitigation, may benefit from
recognizing not only that suburbs are distinct from urban
cores, but also that different types of suburbs exist, each
of which present distinct challenges and opportunities for
building community resilience.95
We have an opportunity now to create communities
that are resilient to climate-related risks, and that provide
mitigation co-benefits. Sixty-six percent of the buildings
in existence by the year 2050 will be built between now
and then.96 By 2040, the United States is projected to add
93 million new homes to accommodate its rapidly growing population. Based on current trends, most of these
homes will be single-family homes that are significantly
less energy-efficient than their multifamily counterparts;
and, based on current planning practices, the occupants of
88. Id. at 6.
89. JoAnn Carmin et al., ICLEI USA-Local Governments for Sustainability,
Progress and Challenges in Urban Climate Adaptation Planning: Results of a
Global Survey (2012), available at http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/
learn-from-others/progress-and-challenges-in-urban-climate-adaptationplanning-results-of-a-global-survey.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id. at 24.
93. See John R. Nolon, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: The Quest
for Green Communities—Part II, 61 Planning & Envtl. L. No. 11, p. 3
(2009); but see New York Community Risk and Resiliency Act, Ch. 355,
N.Y. Laws of 2014 (directing state agencies to prepare model municipal laws
taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related events and
“develop additional guidance on the use of resiliency measures that utilize
natural resources and natural processes to reduce risk”).
94. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 25.
95. See Osofsky, supra note 83; Russell Lopez, Urban Sprawl in the United
States: 1970-2010, 7 Cities & the Env’t (CATE), art. 7 (2014), available
at http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cate/vol7/iss1/7.
96. Nolon, supra note 82, at 6.
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these single-family homes will continue to commute by car
to work, play, and shop.97
It is therefore crucial that local, state, and federal governments act now to assess the role of suburbs in climate
change adaptation and mitigation, and support these entities in their development of adaptation plans, policies, and
infrastructure investments. Otherwise, we are likely to see,
at best, the continued “incremental adaptation assessment
and planning”98 with little implementation observed in the
Summary for Policymakers, and, at worst, maladaptive
changes in suburban infrastructure and land uses.

XI. The Bottom-Up Climate Consensus
This section was authored by Stephen R. Miller, Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law.
Working Group III’s Summary for Policymakers
includes the following empirical claim:
The largest mitigation opportunities with respect to
human settlements are in rapidly urbanizing areas where
urban form and infrastructure are not locked in, but
where there are often limited governance, technical, financial, and institutional capacities.99

The IPCC is comprehensive in its scope and conclusive
in its evidence for climate change. Why, then, has the AR5
failed to be persuasive and, in fact, has seemed to spark a
counteroffensive against the idea of climate change generally? The backlash is a many-headed hydra, but at the
local level, its growth is manifest in anti-Agenda 21 screeds
increasingly heard against local climate action plans in
town halls across the United States. It is easy to write off
the climate change backlash as either political posturing
or ignorance. That would be a mistake; engagement is
necessary. What the IPCC process needs now is not more
science to prove climate change exists; rather, it needs an
approach to planning for climate change that builds consensus and engages diverse stakeholders at the local level
where development decisions are made.
While state and federal laws have, within the last few
decades, increasingly limited local control, cities still make
the lion’s share of choices over the shape of development
in the United States. This decentralization of land use
decisionmaking is especially important in understanding
consensus and climate change: If there is no consensus
to address climate change in these decentralized land use
decisions, then it will be very difficult for the country as a
whole to achieve a viable climate policy.
A brief review of the rise of cities makes their importance clear.100 Around 2010, more than one-half of the
97. See id.; Lopez, supra note 95.
98. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 8.
99. WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at §4.2.5.
100. See also Stephen R. Miller, The Sustainable, Inevitably Exploding City, in
Michael Burger et al., Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change
Challenge, 43 ELR 10342, 10346 (Apr. 2013); Boundaries of Nature and
the American City, in Environmental Law and Contrasting Ideas
of Nature: A Constructivist Approach (Keith Hirokawa ed., 2014);
Sustainable Cities of Tomorrow: A Land Use Response to Climate Change, in

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

45 ELR 10042

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

world’s population was living in cities; by 2050, 70% of the
world’s population will live in cities. The world is expected
to add over 2 billion new people to the planet by 2050,
which is the equivalent of building a new city of 1.4 million every week through the mid-century mark. Existing
cities in industrialized nations, such as the United States,
have “locked in” high energy use through high-energy
infrastructure. The best chance of reducing GHG emission growth is for future cities in both industrialized and
developing countries to build a low-carbon infrastructure.
This infrastructure imperative is both an unprecedented
opportunity and an unprecedented challenge. It is an
opportunity because, if we get city planning right in the
21st century, we can have great places to live while at the
same time mitigating and adapting to climate change. It
is a challenge because the places where people are increasingly moving, in industrialized nations, are cities that
are specifically seeking to grow economically by permitting inexpensive but high-GHG lifestyles. (In developing
nations, not discussed here, different urbanization patterns
arise, but also necessitate greater local consensus.)
Consider the complexity of consensus-building among
cities in the United States. According to the last census,
the two fastest growing regions of the country were the
mountain West and the South. These are also states and
cities that are deliberately luring in residents through
policies promoting cheap living through easy, and largely
unregulated, housing development. Such states and cities
are equally luring businesses through concerted deregulation and economic incentives from the Northeast, western
coastal states, and the industrial Midwest. The approach
has proven remarkably successful in terms of short-term
economic growth. The poster child for this approach is
Texas, which has one of the fastest growing economies,
but also spends $0.514 of every state dollar on economic
development incentives to businesses, according to a New
York Times study.101 In other words, the prospect of states
like Texas, and most of the South and the mountain West,
depends upon providing an alternative to the regulatory
strictures of places taking climate change seriously. The
current economic strategy of such locations is deliberately
to welcome climate change regulation refugees.
Meaningful climate change consensus, then, requires
a consensus among decentralized decisionmakers, such
as states and cities, that climate change does matter and,
accordingly, skirting regulation cannot be used as an economic development tool. That will be a tough challenge.
Finding consensus on climate policy is not easy even in
progressive bastions. Take, for instance, the San Francisco
region’s Plan Bay Area, arguably the country’s most important effort to link land use and transportation planning
to reduce climate change. The plan is the subject of four
lawsuits by environmentalists, environmental justice advoRethinking Sustainable Development to Meet the Climate Change
Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith Hirokawa eds., forthcoming 2015).
101. Louise Story et al., Explore Government Subsidies, N.Y. Times (2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html?
_r=0#TX.
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cates, “post-sustainability” anti-Agenda 21 groups, and a
local real estate lobby. Thus, even with consensus on climate change’s existence, there is difficulty in building consensus on the implementation of climate change planning
and adaptation.
To address climate change, places like the American
South and mountain West must want to build cities that
are resource-efficient. Even in progressive locales like San
Francisco, implications of climate change policy must be
more forthcoming. Consensus-building must focus on
detailing the day-to-day efforts necessary to mitigate and
adapt to climate change. Facilitating local consensus on
climate change has not been undertaken by the IPCC in
any meaningful way. The IPCC reports acknowledge this
deficiency to some extent. Buried deep in the Working
Group II report is a call for “engaging stakeholders” in the
process of climate change decisionmaking.102 However, as
an indicator of the failure to engage, the section notes a
recent study finding that only 40% of vulnerability mapping exercises included stakeholder participation, which
“rais[ed] questions about the legitimacy and salience of
contemporary approaches” to climate change planning.103
If we are to build or rebuild cities to benefit the climate,
we must start the planning process with stakeholders’ daily
lives and daily choices. The global impacts of small sacrifices must be clear; people need a vision of what it means
to live a life that saves the planet in their own community.
It is on the basis of those facts that consensus can be built,
not just at the federal level, but also in town halls where
development decisions are made. The IPCC has historically
been a document of collective scientific reportage. What is
needed now is a bottom-up component to the process, one
in which individuals acting locally understand the climate
implications of local actions.
When Georges-Eugène Haussmann was cutting imperial boulevards through Paris’ medieval core, Charles
Baudelaire wrote with solace, “The form of a city changes
faster, alas, than the human heart.” As our cities, and our
climate, now change even faster than our hearts, we must
find paths to consensus—locally, nationally, and internationally—that work politically from the bottom up and
give all of us a reason to forsake immediate gains in favor
of a better life for generations to come.

XII. Protecting Habitat on the Move
This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers makes
the following empirical claims:
Many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species have
shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances, and species interactions in
response to ongoing climate change (high confidence).
102. WGII AR5, supra note 32, at §8.4.2.1.
103. Id.
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While only a few recent species extinctions have been
attributed as yet to climate change (high confidence), natural global climate change at rates slower than current
anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions
of years (high confidence).104

These most recent findings of the IPCC confirm something that conservation biologists and other scientists have
already been observing and writing about for years: Climate change means landscape change. As the world warms
and sea level rises, ecosystems will both shift and reconfigure. The AR5 designates this at its highest confidence
level, stating that change has already occurred (and will
continue to occur) and it will do so in virtually every type
of landscape: terrestrial; freshwater; and marine life. As climate change results in changed landscapes, our strategies
for how we interact and behave on the land has no choice
but to shift as well. In particular, this section focuses on
what this means for land conservation and goals of protecting specific endangered species or ecosystems.
Current land conservation policies focus on static programs that assume land conserved today should be conserved in the future, and that the same conservation goals
will be met across time scales. Little attention has been paid
to how changes to the landscape will affect the priorities of
conserved land or how land management processes or land
conservation strategies will need to change in response to
changes on the land. For example, a 2011 survey of 73 land
conservation organizations (both nonprofit organizations
and government agencies) across the United States that use
conservation easements as a land protection mechanism
found that while most organizations agreed that climate
change was likely to impact not only their region, but also
their conservation efforts, few had taken or even planned
to take active measures to respond to the likely changes.105
Indeed, the private land conservation movement has been
dominated by the use of perpetual property tools that set
the status quo as the conservation goal in perpetuity with
few mechanisms to revisit that goal or to consider whether
the current makeup of the land will be either possible or
desirable as climate change shifts landscapes.106
The AR5 report discusses the benefit of different types
of land uses (suggesting that certain types of development might be more harmful or that forestry could be
a good thing if done right), but does not go so far as to
discuss the legal mechanisms being used to protect and
promote specific land uses.107 In the United States, conservation easements have become the favored tool for private
land protection. That trend is slowly spreading to other
104. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 4.
105. See Adena R. Rissman et al., Adapting Conservation Easements to Climate
Change, Conservation Letters (2014), available at http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12099/abstract;jsessionid=0B9D2389ABE77
6F762C692BD52885EB8.f04t03?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&use
rIsAuthenticated=false.
106. See Adena R. Rissman et al., Private Land Conservation & Climate
Change: Rethinking Strategies & Tools (forthcoming 2015).
107. See generally WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28.
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regions of the world, including other common-law countries like Australia and Canada, where property law tools
are already similar to those in the United States, as well
as places with other legal traditions like Latin America
and Africa. Indeed, conservation easements are often the
cornerstone of key climate change policies, such as the
U.N. collaborative initiative REDD (Reducing Emissions
From Deforestation and Forest Degradation), or sustainable agriculture, where property agreements such as
conservation easements and other servitudes burden the
land, requiring adherence to certain environmental standards.108 In fact, conservation easements may be seen as a
way to ensure that carbon sequestration gains are realized
(for example, preventing forests from being cut down by
subsequent landowners or prohibiting farmers from abandoning agricultural practices).109
Conservation easements, however, may be particularly
ill-suited to a changing world without undergoing some
changes themselves. Generally, a conservation easement
defines today’s use of the land and requires perpetuation
of that use. Instead, conservation easements should adopt
adaptive management principles and create mechanisms
that allow for things that might sound radical, such as
changing management provisions or even possibly moving protected areas to follow species migrations.110 In some
cases, a simple change may be to convert perpetual conservation easements to term agreements that look more
like conservation leases. This could allow conservation
organizations to continually assess the conservation value
of protecting the property and consider shifting levels of
encumbrance on landowner activities.
In addition, land conservationists need to recognize not
only that conservation easements are not the only tool presently in their tool box, but also that they need to work on
adding tools to that kit. The current embrace and growth
of conservation easements demonstrates the possibility
for developing new public and private tools to meet community land-protection needs. Already, groups are experimenting with (and scholars are beginning to write about)
using options differently, making payments for protection
of ecosystem services, and exploring uses of endowments or
annuities for land protection.111
Moreover, private contract- and payment-based tools
will likely prove inadequate on their own. Regulatory prohibitions on harmful activities are needed to meet goals of
both mitigation and adaptation.112 For example, state legislatures and courts could begin by acknowledging the idea
108. See Alain Karsenty et al., “Carbon Rights,” REDD+, and Payments for Environmental Services, 35 Envtl. Sci. & Pol’y 20 (2014).
109. See Steven Ruddell et al., The Role for Sustainably Managed Forests in Climate
Change Mitigation, 105 J. Forestry 314 (2007); James L. Olmsted, Carbon
Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in Conservation Easements,
29 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 121 (2009).
110. See Jesse J. Richardson Jr., Conservation Easements and Adaptive Management, 3 Sea Grant L. & Pol’y J. 31 (2010); Adena R. Rissman et al., Conservation Easements: Biodiversity Protect and Private Use, 21 Conservation
Biology 709 (2007).
111. See, e.g., Rissman et al., supra note 106.
112. See W. Neil Adger et al., Successful Adaptation to Climate Change Across
Scales, 15 Global Envtl. Change 77 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Super
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of rolling easements along coastlines where protected areas
shift as sea levels rise, even if this will mean loss of private
land.113 While the public trust doctrine protects these areas
in theory, many governments are too nervous about potential constitutional Takings Clause claims to disrupt private
property owners’ expectations (whether those expectations
are reasonable or not). Our culture is so busy worshipping
at the altar of private property rights that we are likely to
degrade, or even destroy, the very idol sitting before us.

XIII. Law Confronts the Intertwined Threats
of Climate Change and Species
Extinction
This section was authored by David Takacs, Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
We share the Earth with millions of gorgeous species,
the current, ephemeral expressions of over 3 billion years
of biological evolution. All species are cogs in functioning ecosystems that support all life. All humans require
a diversity of species to feed, heal, and inspire us. With
“high confidence,” Working Group III’s Summary for Policymakers asserts that “[a] large fraction of both terrestrial
and freshwater species faces increased extinction risk under
projected climate change during and beyond the 21st
century, especially as climate change interacts with other
stressors, such as habitat modification, over-exploitation,
pollution, and invasive species.”114 The Summary further
notes that “[m]any species will be unable to track suitable climates under mid- and high-range rates of climate
change.”115 That is to say, continued evolution in the face
of a most unnatural selection is unlikely for most species,
and thus “[t]hose that cannot adapt sufficiently fast will go
extinct in part or all of their ranges.”116
Temperatures will rise, droughts will exacerbate, storms
will intensify, pests will spread, pollinators will go extinct
or lose synchronicity with the plants they pollinate, and all
the while, human populations will be expanding and on
the move, exploiting more of the ecosystems upon which
all human life depends. Through the alchemy of photosynthesis, terrestrial ecosystems absorb about one-quarter
of human CO2 emissions; deforestation disrupts this vital
ecosystem service and currently accounts for about 15-20%
of GHG emissions. So, as climate change and human needs
degrade natural ecosystems—as plants are felled, burned,
or eaten; as tundra melts; as peat bogs desiccate—climate
change worsens, further imperiling species and ecosystems.
Paying attention to the twinned threats of climate
change and species extinction requires ingenuity, cash,
and nimble legal mechanisms. Two novel solutions—
Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the
Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153 (2009).
113. See So-Min Cheong, Policy Solutions in the U.S., 106 Climate Change 57,
61-62 (2011) (describing rolling easements).
114. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 14-15.
115. Id. at 15.
116. Id.
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REDD+ and biodiversity offsetting—comprise potentially
win-win solutions.
In REDD+, a local community, individual landowner,
private developer, or government entity reforests degraded
land or preserves a forest that would otherwise be felled.
The actor may then sell the stored carbon for a contracted
period of time to entities that want to offset their GHG
emissions or simply want to preserve forests. REDD+ may
happen on a project-by-project basis. Increasingly, however,
it is operating on a broader scale: A nation, province, or
state uses REDD+ funds to reduce deforestation or promote reforestation in a wide geographic area, resulting in
greater stored carbon than would have occurred without
the funding.
REDD+ blurs the bounds between global mitigation
and local adaptation. REDD+ mitigates climate change
when trees retain carbon that deforestation would otherwise release, or if new growth absorbs extra CO2. Healthy
forests help communities adapt to climate change by sustaining ecosystem services—preventing erosion, increasing rainfall, buffering floods, cleansing drinking water,
and harboring crop pollinators—and by preserving biodiversity crucial for human survival. REDD+ investments
can promote socioeconomic climate change adaptation
through new sources of income and by providing for more
secure, formal land title. REDD+ may also further institutional adaptation as community leaders, landowners, and
government officials develop and manage REDD+ projects and hone skills and institutions to negotiate effectively
with project developers and government functionaries.
Biodiversity offsets, in turn, translate the logic of carbon offsetting into something more sweeping. In more
than two dozen jurisdictions, developers are being allowed
to destroy biodiversity in one place in exchange for protecting biodiversity elsewhere. They are trading life for
life. As in REDD+, if biodiversity offsetting works as its
backers promise, then it’s a win-win situation: Jurisdictions
encourage economic development where it is needed and
can prioritize preservation where it is most effective and
beneficial to the species, ecosystems, and human communities of concern.
To fulfill their promise, biodiversity offsets must both
mitigate the original damage and enhance the chance for
a species to survive. But is life fungible? Let’s put aside for
the moment the question of whether it is ethically legitimate to harm one biological community (and perhaps
harm the human communities that depend upon those
communities) in exchange for biological mitigation elsewhere. In the name of preservation of an imperiled species
or ecosystem type, conservation biology may support offsetting. Given climate change, isolated small preserves may
allow species nowhere to go, and static management that
does not respond to ecological change may result in local
extinctions as well as global ones. Prioritizing fewer, larger
reserves (as opposed to scattered, smaller ones) can help
preserve greater genetic diversity (and thus a more resilient species response to climate change). Offsetting might
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also prioritize corridors and connectivity to allow species to
migrate to more suitable habitats.
The IPCC notes that governing a transition toward an
effective climate response and sustainable development
pathway is “a challenge involving rethinking our relation
to nature, accounting for multiple generations and interests (including those based on endowments in natural
resources), overlapping environmental issues, among actors
with widely unequal capacities, resources, and political
power, and divergent conceptions of justice.”117 REDD+
and biodiversity offsetting do not change existing societal
patterns unless they are done in ways that are transformative: transferring large quantities of wealth from North
to South; inventing nimble and flexible uses of land not
subject to the strictures of private property or rigid governmental control; fomenting true environmental democracy as communities are empowered to formulate, manage,
and reap economic and ecological benefits from REDD+
projects or biodiversity banks, and/or implemented with
the most capacious possible interpretation of international
human rights law.118
Whether they function effectively in the short term, or
lead to genuine transformation in the long run, REDD+,
biodiversity offsetting, or any other legal regime to preserve
Earth’s myriad species and the humans that depend upon
them, must be implemented sustainably and in a deeply
equitable way. For REDD+ or biodiversity offsetting to be
sustainable, it must be: (1) effective—working for all stakeholders with minimal complication; (2) synergistic—maximizing benefits for climate, biodiversity, and local people;
and (3) equitable—narrowing gaps between rich and poor.
“Deep equity,” in turn, refers to the laws, policies, and values that promote sustainable pathways acting in synergy to
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and ecosystems. The equity is “deep” because values become rooted within each individual, requiring that
we fundamentally reenvision our community structures and
responsibilities and root these values and responsibilities in
our legal systems. Our laws and policies would, in turn, support values and actions promoting even deeper equity.
Neither REDD+ nor biodiversity offsetting offers a
permanent solution to the species extinction crisis. They
are stopgap, emergency legal mechanisms that buy (literally) time for us to transition to a non-hydrocarbon-based
economy and for the planet to heal and rebound from heat
and chaos. Poorly designed REDD+ projects and biodiversity offsets may facilitate ecologically damaging human
development, and may simply accelerate biodiversity loss
in the face of climate change, undermining humans’ own
options for adaptation and survival. If done well, however,
they offer enhanced resilience for local human and nonhuman communities in the present, bandages to staunch
wounds while we find the moxie to address the underlying
causes of species extinction.
117. WGIII AR5, supra note 18, ch. 4 at 4.
118. For a list of articles on this topic, please visit Social Science Research Network, David Takacs’ Scholarly Papers, http://ssrn.com/author=1393231.
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XIV. Addressing Climate Change Without
Talking About Climate Change
This section was authored by Inara Scott, Assistant Professor,
College of Business, Oregon State University.
Talking about climate change gets depressing fast. The
AR5 does not help. Though the practical reality of the
current situation is buried deep in scenarios, options, and
complex modeling, the bottom line is that the current rate
of emissions will bring global temperature increases in
the range of 3.7-4.8°C by 2100,119 a scenario most agree
would be “devastating” to human society.120 A “4°C world”
will experience severe drought, species and habitat extinction, and risk worldwide tipping points with unpredictable
future outcomes.121
Given this dramatic trajectory, why do only 34% of
Americans worry “a great deal” about climate change?122
One problem may be our cognitive hardwiring. As a species, humans are not good at making long-term decisions
and are particularly apt to choose short-term gains over
long-term benefits. Also, studies suggest that activism is
likely to be driven in part by feelings of efficacy—that is,
the more hopeless and dire the situation appears, the less
likely people will be to get involved in political advocacy.123
Thus, our attempts to inspire activism by educating people
about the enormity of the climate change problem may
backfire by making people less likely to become involved
in climate activism.
But what is the alternative? What do I suggest for those
of us who are deeply concerned about the impacts of climate change, and want to inspire action toward both adaptation and mitigation? Absolutely not to ignore, turn back,
or stop important research and outreach related to the
causes and long-term impacts of climate change. However,
as lawyers who are deeply attuned to the power of language
and the art of persuasion, I believe we must recognize the
harm we may be doing by leading our arguments with the
devastating and irreversible effects of climate change, and
consider when and where to emphasize positive and realistic strategies for mitigation and adaptation.
The topic of national security provides an excellent
backdrop for exploring this concept. Working Group II
describes significant risks to human security from climate
change, including displacement and migration caused by
rising sea levels, loss of arable land, and drought.124 Conflicts over scarce resources, including food and water, can
119. WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2.
120. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al., World Bank, Executive summary, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4 Degree Celsius Warmer World
Must Be Avoided v (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/2012/11/17485703/turn-down-heat-4-degree-celsius-warmer-worldmust-avoided-executive-summary.
121. See id. at 1-2; WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 13.
122. Frank Newport, Americans Show Low Levels of Concern on Global Warming,
Gallup, Apr. 14, 2014 http://www.gallup.com/poll/168236/americansshow-low-levels-concern-global-warming.aspx.
123. Connie Roser-Renouf et al., The Genesis of Climate Change Activism: From
Key Beliefs to Political Action, 125 Climatic Change 163 (2014).
124. See WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 20.
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exacerbate conflicts between nations and increase instability of governments. Climate change must be considered
as a “threat multiplier,” which exacerbates existing conflicts and risks—including the radicalization of tensions
between and among ethnic and religious groups and the
spread of terrorism.125 It takes little imagination to conclude that a hot, arid, water-constrained planet, marked by
warring ethnic and religious factions and unstable governments, threatens U.S. interests, both abroad and at home.
Yet, in the area of national security, there is much that
can be done toward the twin goals of adaptation and mitigation that is practical and achievable. The U.S. military,
the single largest energy consumer in the world,126 has a
deeply rooted interest in minimizing its dependence on fossil fuels. Meeting the fossil fuel needs of military operations
requires constant resupply and fuel delivery, demanding
huge amounts of financial and troop resources and putting those working on supply chains at significant risk.127
Technological innovation in the areas of energy efficiency,
renewable resources, and alternative fuels could reduce
military casualties, improve mobility, and minimize vulnerabilities to attack. It could also have profound impacts
on global carbon emissions and, as a result, reduce the
extent of global warming.128 Through congressional and
presidential mandates, the U.S. Department of Defense is
uniquely positioned among government agencies to invest
in renewable energy and energy-efficiency technologies.129
However, if the rhetoric for such efforts is based primarily
on threats related to climate change, they are vulnerable to
(at best) public apathy or (at worst) political stonewalling.130
Other political strategies related to improving national
security also have the potential for significant climate
change mitigation. For example, efforts to prevent deforestation in Indonesia through programs like REDD could
help stabilize the fragile Indonesian government—a key
U.S. security goal because of the country’s large Muslim
population, which could become a threat if it were to

125. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 8 (2014),
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the
Accelerating Risks of Climate Change 2 (2014), available at http://
www.cna.org/sites/default/files/MAB_2014.pdf [hereinafter CNA Report].
126. Siddhartha M. Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and National Security, 3 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J.
309, 323-28 (2012).
127. See id. at 324.
128. Limiting global warming will require significant reductions in fossil fuel
consumption. Working Group III notes that scenarios limiting global temperature increases to 2°C include “more rapid improvements in energy efficiency, a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-carbon energy supply from renewables, [and] nuclear energy and fossil energy
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) or bioenergy with CCS.”
WGIII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 13.
129. For a thorough discussion of the complex relationship between the military
and the environment, and the potential for the military to drive innovation
in the energy industry, see Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 879, 907-14 (2014).
130. Climate Science Watch, House Votes to Direct the Pentagon to Disregard
Climate Change Assessments, June 24, 2014, at http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2014/06/24/house-votes-to-direct-the-pentagon-to-disregardclimate-change-assessments/.
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become radicalized.131 At home, a number of major military
installations, including Naval Station Norfolk, are in areas
threatened by rising sea levels and storms, which threaten
both the military bases and the surrounding communities.132 Adaptation to these conditions may require modification of roads, bridges, water systems, and both public
and private infrastructure.133 While the long-term impact
of climate change is clearly relevant in both cases, “4°C
world” scenarios are not necessary to prove the importance
and benefit of taking such measures.
The problem of climate change requires a multifaceted
approach. The area of national security provides fertile
ground for mitigation and adaptation efforts that improve
U.S. security and address current vulnerabilities, while
also offering significant co-benefits in the fight against
global warming. The key to achieving those benefits may
lie in an emphasis on practical, achievable, and positive
steps to change.

XV. Agnostic Adaptation
This section was authored by Katrina Fischer Kuh, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Intellectual Life and Hofstra
Research Fellow, Maurice A. Deane School of Law.
Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers makes
the following empirical claims:
Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of
governance are contingent on societal values, objectives,
and risk perceptions (high confidence). Recognition of
diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts,
and expectations can benefit decision-making processes.
Indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and
practices, including indigenous peoples’ holistic view of
community and environment, are a major resource for
adapting to climate change, but these have not been used
consistently in existing adaptation efforts. Integrating
such forms of knowledge with existing practices increases
the effectiveness of adaptation.
Decision support is most effective when it is sensitive
to context and the diversity of decision types, decision processes, and constituencies (robust evidence, high
agreement). Organizations bridging science and decision
making, including climate services, play an important
role in the communication, transfer, and development
of climate-related knowledge, including translation,
engagement, and knowledge exchange (medium evidence, high agreement).134

Agnostic adaptation means adaptation without the
why—the divorce of adaptation from knowledge or acceptance of climate change being humans’ fault. Adaptation is
131. See Joshua W. Busby, Council on Foreign Relations, Climate
Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, CFR No.
32, at 20-21 (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/
climate-change-national-security/p14862.
132. See CNA Report, supra note 125, at 25.
133. See id.
134. WGII Summary for Policymakers, supra note 28, at 26.
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agnostic when one prepares for or responds to an actual or
projected climate change-induced impact (for example, by
planting a drought-resistant crop) without acknowledging
that the adaptation is probabilistically or in fact necessarily because of anthropogenic climate change (that drought
conditions are caused or exacerbated by humans’ emissions
of CO2 and other GHGs).
At the individual level, agnostic adaptation is natural
and ubiquitous. When it is uncomfortably hot, people turn
on air conditioners, flee to the beach, and visit local park
sprinklers. Similarly, they gradually and logically update
the stock of boots, umbrellas, and coats in their closets to match the weather they have become accustomed
to experiencing, most often with nary a thought of climate change. Considering how adaptation policy should
approach agnostic adaptation is, however, more difficult.
Should our domestic adaptation policy connect adaptation
to anthropocentric climate change? Should it tolerate, or
even facilitate, agnostic adaptation?
Numerous government policies or programs are purposefully oriented toward preparing for or adjusting to
climate change impacts. For example, executive orders
direct federal agencies to promote adaptation in various
ways, including by preparing agency adaptation plans.135
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
includes the following:
Action 2: FSA will partner with the REE mission area, as
well as NGOs, to publicize and/or make available decision
support tools at field offices, facilitating their outreach. An
example of such a tool to encourage use of seasonal climate information in farm management decisions is Agroclimate, a project of the Southeast Climate Consortium
(Agroclimate 2011).136

The AgroClimate website provides detailed information to help farmers better manage climate risks, including
those associated with climate change, and features climate
risk analyses, drought indices, and a cooling/heating degree
days calculator.137 Although there are a few references to
climate change on the website, it is a fair characterization
that the site does not emphasize the connection between
135. Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 8, 2009). Agencies are
also instructed to direct federal funding to support climate resilience and
to design and implement “land- and water-related policies, programs, and
regulations . . . to make the Nation’s watersheds, natural resources, and ecosystems, and the communities and economies that depend on them, more
resilient in the face of a changing climate.” Exec. Order No. 13653, 78 Fed.
Reg. 66819 (Nov. 6, 2013).
136. USDA Farm Service Agency Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
39-40 (2012).
137. AgroClimate, Tools for Managing Climate Risk in Agriculture, http://agroclimate.org/fact-sheets-climate.php (lasted visited July 25, 2014). AgroClimate is a product of the Southeast Climate Consortium, a coalition of six
universities funded in part by governmental agencies and programs with the
mission “to use advances in climate sciences, including improved capabilities to forecast seasonal climate and long-term climate change, to provide
scientifically sound information and decision support tools for agricultural
ecosystems, forests and other terrestrial ecosystems, and coastal ecosystems
of the Southeastern USA.” Southeast Climate Consortium, Mission, http://
www.seclimate.org/mission.php (last visited July 25, 2014).
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anthropogenic causes and the climate change adaptation
measures that it advances.138 This, then, appears to provide
an example of how adaptation policy may tolerate, if not
facilitate, agnostic adaptation in some contexts.
The example chosen here, involving the communication of adaptation strategies to farmers in the Southeast,
provides a good illustration of possible rationales for
incorporating agnostic adaptation into adaptation policy.
Many in the United States reject anthropogenic climate
change139; perhaps agnostic adaptation outreach will make
such individuals more receptive to taking adaptive measures. Perhaps, farmers in the Southeast are more likely
to use and trust an agricultural adaptation website that
downplays anthropogenic climate change, thereby rendering the agnostic adaptation policy more effective.140 And
because the benefits of effective adaptation accrue locally
and to individuals, there is ample incentive for individuals and communities to adapt regardless of their beliefs
about why there is a need to adapt. Additionally, predictions about the impacts of climate change are uncertain,
particularly at the local level. Another possible benefit of
agnostic adaptation policy is that it may relieve the burden
of ascertaining and communicating connections between
anthropogenic climate change and specific on-the-ground
impacts, thereby conserving resources for direct adaptation measures.
However, agnostic adaptation policy also raises concerns.
Excising anthropogenic climate change information from
adaptation outreach, or simply downplaying the connection between the need to adapt and anthropogenic climate
change, may undermine mitigation efforts by obscuring
a potentially powerful rationale for mitigation policy: the
fact that climate change will threaten the individuals who

138. A paper that can be downloaded from the site discusses rainfall intensity.
A section titled Climate Change Projections states: “Warmer air can hold
more water vapor, and if temperatures continue to rise, the projections of
future climate suggest there will be continued increases in high-intensity
rain events.” Southeast Climate Extension, Rainfall Intensity Changes in the
Southeastern U.S. In a paper titled Climate Trends in the Southeast: Temperature, a section on Causes of Changes in Temperature states: “Most scientists believe that these increases in temperature are due to increases in
greenhouse gases, which trap heat near the surface of the earth rather than
releasing it back into space.” The site also offers a carbon footprint calculator
tool indexed to different crops.
139. Gallup Politics, One in Four in U.S. Are Solidly Skeptical of Global Warming (Apr. 22, 2014) (presenting the results of detailed polling of American
regarding attitudes toward and beliefs about climate change), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/168620/one-four-solidly-skeptical-global-warming.aspx
(last visited July 27, 2014).
140. In a similar fashion, in the mitigation context, a kind of veiled mitigation
strategy divorces actions to reduce GHG emissions from climate mitigation
by suggesting that individuals be encouraged to reduce energy use or take
other measures that will reduce emissions for reasons other than avoiding
climate change, such as energy independence or thrift. See Roger A. Pielke
Jr., The Case for a Sustainable Climate Policy: Why Costs and Benefits Must Be
Temporally Balanced, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1843, 1850 (2007)
Ultimately, motivating local action to mitigate global climate
change calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the ways in which
emissions-producing activities are embedded in broader community concerns. The primary benefit of an indirect approach is that
it avoids many of the political debates about climate change science
that have plagued international efforts to address this issue.
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are the subject of adaptation outreach.141 Ultimately, mitigation is a necessary part of successful adaptation because
our capacity to adapt could be overwhelmed. The question
thus becomes whether agnostic adaptation policy is better at promoting adaptation in the long run. This analysis
would require weighing any short-term benefit from more
effectively spurring adaptive behaviors in skeptical communities against any longer term influence on the pace and
scale of mitigation.
As a practical matter, agnostic adaptation outreach
may make it more difficult to structure adaptation policy to promote mitigation co-benefits (decrease emissions) and avoid adverse mitigation side effects (increase
emissions).142 It is hard to promote or discourage an
adaptive measure in part because it reduces or produces
emissions without first acknowledging that emissions
contribute to climate change. Agnostic adaptation policy is also somewhat unpalatable from the perspective
of international climate justice. Some of the most com-

pelling normative claims for the United States to contribute to international adaptation or mitigation efforts
rest upon recognition of anthropocentric climate change
and the historic and present U.S. contribution of GHG
emissions. Agnostic adaptation may enhance our already
superior domestic adaptation capacity in a manner that
handicaps the development of public and political support for international adaptation assistance.
Ultimately, evaluating agnostic adaptation policy
requires resolution of a series of empirical questions that
are better-suited to resolution by the social and communication sciences. For example, will adaptation outreach be
more effective if it does not attribute the need for adaptation to climate change and/or attribute climate change to
human causes, and what effect does coupling adaptation
outreach with information about anthropogenic climate
change have on attitudes toward mitigation?143 We should,
however, take care to understand the answers to these
questions when contemplating agnostic adaptation policy.

141. Cara Pike, Adaptation Communications: An Overview of the Research and Practice (2013), http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/
pdf/2-adaptation-communications-overview-3-21.pdf (observing that education about climate impacts can increase interest in mitigation and that
“[u]nderstanding of adaptation can lead to heightened interest in mitigation
but more on the ground examples are needed.”).
142. For a discussion of the need for and benefits of holistic climate change governance considering both mitigation and adaptation, see Katherine Trisolini, Holistic Climate Change Governance: Towards Mitigation and Adaptation
Synthesis, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 615 (2014).

143. The site Climate Access compiles research into climate change communication, including with respect to adaptation outreach. Climate Access,
Resource Hub, http://www.climateaccess.org/resource-hub. An interesting
study is Amanda Carrico et al., Does Learning About Climate Change Adaptation Change Support for Mitigation?, 41 J. Envtl. Psych. 19 (2014).
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